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A NEW STANDARD ARFSES REGARDING
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF
EMPLOYER NO-SOLICITATION RULES:
RESTAURANT CORPORATION OF AMERICA
v. NLRB
In an attempt to improve labor-management relations and
promote the free flow of commerce, Congress enacted the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA" or "the Act").1 Section 7 of
the Act gives employees the right to associate freely, organize, and
bargain collectively, 2 while section 8 subjects employers to sanc-
The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) [hereinafter "NLRA" or "Act"]. The
preamble of the Act states:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ... by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
In order to effectuate the policy of the Act, Congress created the National Labor Rela-
tions Board ("NLRB" or "Board"), id. §§ 153-56, which has both rule making, id. § 156, and
adjudicatory power, id. § 160(a). The Board consists of five members appointed by the Pres-
ident, subject to Senate confirmation, for a five year term. Id. § 153(a). Although the Board
originally had the power to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate violations, the Act was
later amended to vest the Board's investigatory and prosecutory powers in a separate Gen-
eral Counsel appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See R. GORMAN, BA-
SIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 5, 7 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the origin and development of the NLRB and the policy behind enactment of the
NLRA, see generally A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 8-19 (1960); Morris, The
Developing Labor Law, 1 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT 3-48 (2d ed. 1983).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides that: "[e]mployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Id. Courts have
held that the protections of section 7 apply equally to both union and non-union employees.
See Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 237, 241 (6th Cir. 1980) (unorganized employee
walkout protesting work-related grievances protected since "Congress ... clearly intended
to protect not only concerted activity under the sanction of a labor union, but also concerted
activity of the same nature engaged in by unorganized employees.").
Some employee rights under section 7 have been held so essential that they may not be
waived even in a collective bargaining agreement. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322,
324-25 (1974) (right to solicit union support at plant during non-working hours could not be
waived); Note, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee
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tions for improper abridgment of these rights.' Courts have recog-
nized, however, that employers may limit section 7 employee rights
to preserve production and maintain workplace discipline.4 Conse-
Union Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374, 374-75 (1985) (Act protects employees' workplace solic-
itation rights to ensure informed choice regarding self-organization).
I See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). Section 8(a) of the NLRA provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization.
Id.
In Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), the Supreme Court explained the
purpose of section 8(a)(3): "The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their
organizational rights. Thus [section] 8(a)(3) ... [is] designed to allow employees to freely
exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from
joining any union without imperiling their livelihood." Id. at 40 (footnote omitted). Section
10(c) provides that if unfair labor practices are found after an administrative hearing, then
the Board is expressly authorized to "issue ... an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including rein-
statement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the
Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). The most common order is reinstatement of a discriminato-
rily discharged employee with back pay. See R. GORMAN, supra note 1, at 138 (asserting that
upon finding of discriminatory discharge ordinary order is reinstatement with back pay);
D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 104 (1976)
("[r]einstatement rights.., are usually automatic"). To be valid, an offer for reinstatement
must be unconditional and extend for a reasonable time. Id. at 104. Courts have accorded
great deference to remedies formulated by the Board pursuant to section 10(c). See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969) (Board's expertise entitles its
choice of remedy special deference); Gerry's Cash Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021, 1025
(1st Cir. 1979) (Board's choice of remedy enforced absent irrational application of Act).
4 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). In Republic Aviation, the
Court noted:
[The Board must provide an adjustment] between the undisputed right of self-
organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undis-
puted right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. Like so
many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised
without regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon
employer or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper discipline are both es-
sential elements in a balanced society.
Id. at 797-98. See also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570-74 (1978) (exercise of em-
ployees' § 7 rights must be balanced against employers' management interests); Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 504-07 (1978) (Board must strike "appropriate balance be-
tween organizational and employer rights"); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 692
F.2d 1115, 1120 (7th Cir. 1982) (right to communicate at jobsite limited by employer right to
direct work force and control access), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
Employees' section 7 rights have also been balanced against other employer rights and
managerial concerns. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (Board must
resolve conflicts between employees' section 7 rights and employers' private property
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quently, courts have allowed employers to issue rules prohibiting
employees from soliciting others to join labor organizations during
"working time" in work areas.5 Nevertheless, an employer may not
enforce even a facially valid no-solicitation rule against union orga-
nizational activity when equally intrusive nonunion solicitations
have occurred with the employer's knowledge. Recently, however,
rights); Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617 (employees' rights to associate freely balanced against em-
ployer's speech rights); NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 230-33 (1949) (employ-
ees' right of access to company-owned meeting hall balanced against employer's property
interest).
See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 n.10. In Republic Aviation, the Court, after
reviewing Board precedent, endorsed presumptions regarding rules against solicitation that
were adopted by the Board in a prior hearing. See id. at 803-04. The Court stated that:
The Act... does not prevent an employer from making and enforcing reasonable
rules covering the conduct of employees on company time. . . . It is therefore
within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid
in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It is
no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or after work, or
during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without
unreasonable restraint. ... [A] rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee
outside of working hours, although on company property... must be presumed to
be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory
in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in
order to maintain production or discipline.
Id. at 803-04 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44 (1943)).
The Board distinguishes employer rules that prohibit solicitation during "working
hours" from those which limit solicitation during "working time." See Our Way, Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. 394, 394-95 (1983). Employer rules prohibiting solicitation during "working time"
are deemed presumptively valid, while those prohibiting such conduct during "working
hours" are deemed presumptively invalid. Id. The effect of such a distinction is that a party
attempting to invalidate a presumptively valid "working time" rule has the burden of show-
ing the rule was communicated or applied to prohibit solicitation when employees are not
actually performing job duties. See id. at 395. A "working hours" rule requires the employer
to clearly convey an intent to permit solicitation during non-working time. See id. at 396;
see also Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749, 750 (1974) (rule forbidding solicitation during
"working time" held facially valid).
o See, e.g., Midwest Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(enforcement against employee distributing pro-union literature improper if employer al-
lows distribution of anti-union literature); William L. Bonnell Co. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 593,
595 (5th Cir. 1969) (enforcement against union solicitation prohibited if employer allows
solicitation for raffles and civic drives).
The Board, by examining each case based on its individual facts, determines whether or
not an employer has treated union solicitation in a disparate manner. See Hammary Mfg.
Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 57, 57 n.4 (1982). See also Saint Vincent's Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 38, 38-
41 (1982) (Board analyzed the totality of the circumstances to discern discriminatory en-
forcement), enforcement granted in part, denied in part, 729 F.2d 730 (11th Cir. 1984);
Serv-Air Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 801, 802 n.3 (1969) (disparate treatment established by quantum
of incidents). Any condoned exception to the no-solicitation rule is a factor to be weighed
towards a finding of disparate enforcement against union activity. Hammary, 265 N.L.R.B.
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in Restaurant Corporation of America v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board,7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that an employer might enforce a facially valid no-
solicitation rule against union organizational activity while know-
ingly allowing employees to solicit contributions from other em-
ployees for social purposes."
The Restaurant Corporation of America ("RCA"), which oper-
ated several food service facilities in Washington, D.C.,9 termi-
nated two employees for violation, during working hours, of its
facially valid no-solicitation rule.10 The record indicated that prior
at 57 n.4; see Ridgewood Management Co. v. NLRB, 410 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969); see also Bonnell Co., 405 F.2d at 595 (discriminatory enforce-
ment against union activity found where widespread exceptions and nearly complete lack of
enforcement existed otherwise); NLRB v. Electro Plastic Fabrics, Inc., 381 F.2d 374, 376
(4th Cir. 1967) (discriminatory discharge found where employer allowed anti-union and
"other kinds" of solicitation despite posting and enforcing no-solicitation rule).
An employer may, however, enact a no-solicitation rule that totally prohibits non-em-
ployee union organizers access to company premises, "if reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees
with its message and if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the
union by allowing other distribution." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112
(1956). Unlike employees, non-employee union organizers have the burden of proving: (1)
employer denial of access unreasonably limits effective communication and (2) the ineffec-
tiveness of alternate means of communication. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978); Hutzler Bros. Co. v. NLRB,
630 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Hanley, Union Organization on Company
Property - A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266, 298 (1958) (not unreasonable
to require non-employee union organizer to resort to alternate means).
7 801 F.2d 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1394.
9 Id. at 1392.
10 Id. The rule mandates:
SOLICITATION OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING SOLICITATION FOR CLUBS,
ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, CHARITIES, ETC. IS NOT PER-
MITTED ON WORKING TIME OR IN CUSTOMER AREAS. DISTRIBUTION
OF LITERATURE OF ANY KIND IS NOT PERMITTED ON WORKING
TIME OR IN WORKING AREAS. OFF-SHIFT EMPLOYEES ARE NOT AL-
LOWED ON THE PREMISES.
Id. (emphasis in original). Since application of the rule was limited to "working hours" the
rule was presumptively valid on its face. See id. at 1391; see also infra note 5 and accompa-
nying text (rule presumptively valid unless adopted for discriminatory purpose).
A Restaurant Corporation employee, Herbekian, attempted to persuade co-workers to
join the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25, AFL-CIO. Restaurant Corp., 801
F.2d at 1392. In work areas during working hours, on ten separate occasions, Herbekian
discussed, with employees, the possibility of unionization. Id. Her solicitations "involved an
explanation [to employees] of the comparative merits of the union's dental, hospitalization,
and legal plans." Id. at 1401 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Herbekian approached Dameron, a fellow employee, who subsequently agreed to help in
the organizing effort. Id. at 1392. The record indicated that Dameron solicited five employ-
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to the employee terminations, RCA had allowed six instances of
nonunion solicitation during working time." Both RCA employees
and supervisors participated in these nonunion solicitations, which
consisted of collections for employees. 12 General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") issued
a complaint alleging RCA's actions constituted an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA, which
prohibits discriminatory conduct motivated by an anti-union ani-
mus."5 After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
found RCA in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3). 14 The Board
subsequently adopted this finding and issued its final order which
mandated, inter alia, that RCA cease and desist from disparate
enforcement of its no-solicitation rule.15
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit denied enforce-
ment of the Board's order. 16 Writing for the court, Judge Bork re-
jected the Board's conclusions as not supported by substantial evi-
ees on non-working time and two others during working time. Id. The two working time
solicitations lasted less than five minutes at a time when the employees were not actually
working. Id. at 1397 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Upon learning of the activities of Herbekian and Dameron, the General Manager sus-
pended the two employees pending further investigation of their activities. Id. at 1392.
When the employees later inquired about their job status, both were told they had been
fired. Id.
" Id. at 1393. The solicitations included: (1) an employee taking up a collection on
behalf of another employee who was leaving the company; (2) a supervisor organizing a
collection among the employees to purchase a gift for a departing supervisor; (3) a supervi-
sor collecting from employees on behalf of an employee expecting the birth of a child; (4) an
employee collecting to purchase a birthday cake for another employee; (5) an employee and
a supervisor collecting for a going away present for another employee; and (6) an employee
collecting for a birthday cake for a fellow employee. Id.
2 See id. at 1393.
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
14 Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1393. The Administrative Law Judge ("AL") noted
that several of the nonunion work time solicitations were initiated and participated in by
supervisory personnel. See Restaurant Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. at 1087. In the context of the
case, the ALJ held that the condoned employee and supervisory solicitations were suffi-
ciently numerous to support a finding of discriminatory enforcement against Herbekian and
Dameron. Id. The ALJ also found that RCA had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
coercively interrogating some of its other employees regarding their alleged union activity.
Id. at 1086.
15 Restaurant Corp., 27 N.L.R.B. 1081. The Board ordered that both Herbekian and
Dameron be reinstated to their former positions with back pay. Id. The Board also ordered
RCA to cease and desist from coercively interrogating employees concerning union activi-
ties. Id. RCA did not challenge this part of the Board's decision, but the court neither en-
forced nor denied this part of the order. See Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1404 (MacKin-
non, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
16 Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1396.
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dence in the record. 17 The court found the Board had not produced
sufficient evidence to show that the permitted solicitations "had a
potential for interference with work substantially equivalent to
that of union solicitations."" The court noted that the nonunion
solicitations in the instant case "could seldom, if ever, support
such a finding of equivalent [potential for disruption of work]." 19
Moreover, the court reasoned that the disruptive effect of the non-
union solicitations in cases such as this "is counterbalanced by an
accompanying increase in employee morale and cohesion. '2 0
In dissent, Judge MacKinnon noted that no-solicitation rules
are presumptively valid only when directed towards, and act-
ually preventing interference with, workplace production and disci-
pline.21 Judge MacKinnon argued that since employee solicitations
to join labor unions were made pursuant to a statutory right, the
Board had a duty to ensure that no-solicitation rules were enforced
without regard to the content of the solicitations." Therefore,
Judge MacKinnon concluded, the underlying policy of allowing no-
solicitation rules, to avoid actual disruption in the workplace, re-
quires the courts to compare the challenged instances of union so-
licitation with the condoned instances of nonunion solicitations.3
In Restaurant Corporation, the circuit court, comparing the
17 See id. at 1393.
16 Id. at 1394 (quoting Central Freight Lines v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.
1981)).
19 Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1394 (emphasis omitted).
20 Id.
21 See id. at 1400 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
22 See id. at 1402 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge
MacKinnon noted that disparate enforcement of no-solicitation rules occurs where an em-
ployer treats basically similar conduct differently. See id. at 1401 (MacKinnon, J., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part). Therefore, Judge MacKinnon reasoned, the Board must
engage in a fact-based inquiry and proceed on a case-by-case basis. Id. (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting in'part and concurring in part).
22 Id. (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge MacKinnon
criticized, as being a pure policy statement, the majority's attempt to distinguish beneficent
solicitations, and the supposed positive effects on employee morale from other types of solic-
itation. Id. at 1403 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Although Judge MacKinnon agreed with the court that Herbekian's numerous and sys-
tematic violations of the no-solicitation rule had a comparatively greater actual detrimental
effect on workplace production and discipline than did the social solicitations condoned by
the employer, see id. at 1401 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), he
asserted that Dameron's work time solicitations had a disruptive effect similar to that of the
condoned nonunion solicitations. Thus, he argued that the Board's order with respect to
Dameron should be upheld. See id. at 1402 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
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respective potential for interference with workplace production
and discipline of union and nonunion solicitation, concluded union
solicitation was inherently more disruptive than social solicitation.
In so doing, the court effectively adopted a new standard to test
whether a no-solicitation rule has been enforced discriminatorily.24
It is submitted that, in direct contradiction to the intent and pur-
poses of section 7, this standard discriminates against union or-
ganizing. It is suggested that the court has unduly ventured into
the area of labor policy making, an area in which the Board, with
its long recognized expertise in the formation and refinement of
national labor policy pursuant to the NLRA, properly resides. This
Comment will examine the developing case law on both the judicial
and administrative levels and will suggest that the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit deviated from consistent policy and precedent in
the area of no-solicitation rules. Furthermore, it is asserted that
adoption of an "actual disruption" standard would allow the Board
and the courts to determine more accurately and consistently
whether or not an employee was improperly terminated because of
his protected participation in union organizational activity.
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY FORMATION SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE
NLRB
The court's holding in Restaurant Corporation effectively dis-
regards many of the Board's previous basic policy considerations. 5
Previous cases, relied upon by the majority, in which the Board
has upheld enforcement of no-solicitation rules, rested on a factual
determination of at least some disruptive effect caused by the em-
ployee's union activities." The Restaurant Corporation court,
2 See id. at 1404 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); infra
notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
21 See Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1403 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and con-
curring in part).
26 Id. at 1394 (citing The Seng Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 936, 936 (1974)). In Seng, three em-
ployee organizers were fired for solicitation during work time. See Seng, 210 N.L.R.B. at
936. In each of these situations, the evidence indicated multiple instances of solicitation
during work time, as well as evidence that employees had been solicited while at work. See
id. at 940 n.5. The Board, on the other hand, noted that there was no evidence that the
charitable solicitations had interfered with production. Id.
In Atkins Pickle Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 935 (1970), the Board found that union solicitation
and organizational activity during working hours was detrimental to production, causing
workers to leave'their job posts and gather in small groups. See id. at 935. Evidence did not
indicate that the few non-union solicitations allowed on company time resulted in interfer-
ence with production. Id.
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however, focused on the fact that the condoned solicitations were
limited to beneficent acts whose disruptive effects were "counter-
balanced by an increase in employee morale. '27 The court also
based its decision on the fact that outside organizations had never
been allowed to solicit on company property and, that none of the
company solicitations were for personal profit.28 By including these
grounds, the court, instead of reviewing the Board's policy, en-
gaged in policy making of its own.29 Congress, in an attempt to
promote better labor-management relations, established the NLRB
to balance the competing interests of the employer and the em-
ployee.30 The power and special competence of the Board to create
national labor policies has long been recognized by the courts.3 1
In Serv-Air, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 382 (1966), rev'd, 395 F.2d 557 (10th Cir.), cert denied,
393 U.S. 840 (1968), the terminated employee organizer had solicited eight others on com-
pany time, including employees working at an assembly line. Id. at 392. On remand, the
Board held that three charitable solicitations of short duration did not rise to the level of
disparate enforcement, but noted that:
[w]e do not understand the court of appeals' decision as meaning that a finding of
discriminatory application would not be justified even if numerous solicitations for
various and sundry social and charitable purposes were allowed, but only as con-
cluding that disparate treatment was not established by the quantum of such inci-
dents shown in the record before it.
Serv-Air, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 801, 802 n.3 (1969).
In United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971), the court held that iso-
lated instances of charity and gift solicitation did not prohibit an employer from enforcing a
no-solicitation rule against union activists. See id. at 97. This rule, however, was promul-
gated pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement; the court was reluctant to overturn the
rule because it had played an important part in management-labor negotiations. Id. at 96.
It is asserted that in the above cases, the evidence suggested the actual disruptive effect
of the union solicitation was greater than of the non-union solicitation; therefore, the rule
was properly enforced. Consequently, it is submitted that the Restaurant Corporation
Court's concern with vitiating the efficacy of no-solicitation rules is unfounded.
27 See Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1394.
28 See id. at 1394.
" See id. at 1403 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The court
cited no case in which the Board has considered personal profit as a factor in determining
whether a rule has been improperly enforced. See id. at 1395. The Board has not held that
solicitation based upon charitable motivation is exempt from consideration as to whether or
not an employer disparately enforced a no-solicitation rule. See Saint Vincent's Hosp., 265
N.L.R.B. 38, 40 (1982). The Board, however, has held that employer toleration of intra-
employee social solicitations despite a broad no-solicitation rule may constitute disparate
enforcement. See Idaho Potato Processors Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 910, 911 (1962).
20 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
177 (1981) (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1967)) ("the construc-
tion of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are
compelling indications that it is wrong"). In Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
501 (1978), the Court noted that in labor cases "[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of
19871
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Consequently, courts have traditionally accorded Board decisions
great deference even when the court itself would have reached a
different result had it heard the case de novo."2
It is submitted that the Restaurant Corporation court erred in
substituting its own views of effective labor policy in place of es-
tablished Board policy, absent a showing that the Board had de-
parted from established precedent. Such substitution impedes the
development of a consistent Board policy to ameliorate manage-
ment-employee relations and directly contradicts the Board's man-
date under the NLRA.
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF No-SOLICITATION RULES:
"ACTUAL DISRUPTION" - THE PROPER STANDARD
The decision by the NLRB to forego using its rule-making au-
thority"3 has led to the formulation of policy on a case-by-case ba-
sis,3 4 often obscuring fundamental Board policy.3 5 Similarly, to
the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate na-
tional labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress com-
mitted primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."
Id. at 501 (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)). See also Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945) (Congress used broad language in NLRA
to give Board flexibility to achieve legislative purpose).
32 See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975) (Board decision
subject to limited judicial review); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951) (labor relations requires application of specialized knowledge not possessed by
courts). See generally Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 393, 404 (1981) (courts take limited meaning of rationality in deference to administra-
tive policy judgments).
33 See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 779 n.2 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (NLRB used adjudication instead of rule-making to announce new policies); Bell Aero-
space Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495 n.14 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (NLRB
used substantive rule-making only once since its inception). See generally Peck, The
Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729,
730-32 (1961) (NLRB considers itself a quasi-judicial body).
31 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (rule-making/adjudication
decision up to Board's informed discretion); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 4.16
(1984). See also Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 574-82 (1970) (lack of adequate fact-find-
ing machinery inhibits NLRB rule-making).
"' See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1966) (retro-
active application of new principles by adjudication may have negative effects on parties
relying on old rule in affected industry); Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 395 (1983) (un-
necessary departure from precedent resulted in confusion and unproductive litigation). One
commentator suggested that since the Board's decision is limited to the facts before it, the
members may not fully articulate the policy grounds for their decisions. See Bernstein,
supra note 34, at 576. The Board faces the dilemma of balancing the dangers of premature
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formulate and refine Board policy regarding discriminatory en-
forcement of no-solicitation rules, the Board hears individual cases
and engages in a fact-based inquiry on a case-by-case basis.3 How-
ever, a recurrent theme throughout the cases has been Board con-
sideration of the level and nature of the permitted employer solici-
tation to determine whether the employer has treated basically
similar conduct differently. 7
The Restaurant Corporation court found that if an employee's
generalization and excessive particularization when announcing or modifying policy in the
context of a particular case. See id. at 588. As a result, litigants are often unaware of the
larger issues of policy formation when they appear before the Board and this results in
changes in Board policy in a seemingly haphazard and inconsistent fashion. See id. at 588-
89.
" See, e.g., Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1401 (Board determines what constitutes
discriminatory application case-by-case); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 692 F.2d 1115,
1121 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
.1 See Midwest Stock Exch. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255, 1270 (7th Cir. 1980) (disparate
enforcement where charity solicitations permitted but union solicitations prohibited); Mid-
west Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (permitted com-
pany literature but not union information). See also Mission Valley Mills, 225 N.L.R.B. 442,
447 (1976) (anti-union solicitation invalidates application of rule against union activity); Al-
berts, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 686, 692 (1974) (not infrequent exceptions for birthday and anni-
versary gift solicitation invalidates rule applied against union activities).
The Restaurant Corporation court compared the "nature" of social solicitation with
that of union solicitation and concluded that an employer might choose to punish only
union solicitation of the same nature and frequency, since union activity was potentially
more disruptive. Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1394. It is suggested that according social
solicitation preferential status because of its "superior nature" is unjustified considering
that an employer may enact a rule completely prohibiting social solicitation on the premises,
yet such a rule directed against union solicitation would be invalid on its face. See Gerry's
Cash Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021, 1022 (1st Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers of
America v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Finding union solicitation of a less
beneficial nature than social solicitation allows employers to tolerate the disruptive effects
of solicitations on the workplace while denying employees and the public at large the benefi-
cial effects of collective bargaining sought to be achieved by the Act. See supra notes 1-3
and accompanying text.
The Board has recognized a difference in nature between solicitations engaged in by
employees and solicitations participated in by supervisory personnel. See Saint Vincent's
Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 38, 40-41 (1981). In Saint Vincent's Hospital, the Board noted that
supervisor participation in solicitation for charitable and intra-employee social acts:
constitute[d] substantial evidence that [the employer] discriminatorily enforced
its rule .... We emphasize that this evidence assumes added significance in light
of the active participation of supervisors in the conduct .... Such supervisory
conduct further demonstrates that [the employer] had no interest in enforcing its
rule, apart from its desire to inhibit its employees' union activities.
Id. at 40. The Restaurant Corporation court never considered the participation of supervi-
sory personnel despite the Board's reliance on this fact in reaching its conclusion. See Res-
taurant Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1087 (1981).
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activities caused little actual disruption of the workplace3s-no
more than otherwise had been allowed by the employer 3 - an em-
ployer might still enforce a no-solicitation rule against union at-
tempts to organize provided that the employer did not allow
solicitation which "had a potential for interference with work sub-
stantially equivalent to that of union solicitations. '40 The court
adopted this language from dictum asserted in a Fifth Circuit case
which later was viewed skeptically in that same circuit.4 Previ-
ously, the courts and the Board had held that an employer may
neither promulgate nor enforce a no-solicitation rule based on the
content of the activity.42 It is asserted that the Restaurant Corpo-
11 See Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1392. The actual length of time Dameron spent
discussing union activity with others was disputed. Compare id. at 1392 (five to ten min-
utes) with id. at 1397 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (discussion
lasted less than five minutes with others not actually working at time). Neither version,
however, reveals any disruptive effect on the workplace. See id. at 1397 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
" See id. at 1402 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
40 See id. at 1394 (quoting Central Freight Lines v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1981)) (emphasis added).
"' See id. at 1403 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). In dictum
in Central Freight Lines v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1981), the court suggested that if
the rule had been valid, it might have been disparately enforced because there was "no
evidence" that sports betting, which was allowed by the employer on company time, would
have a potential for interference substantially equivalent to union activity. See id. at 1026.
In NLRB v. Trailways, Inc., 729 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1984), the court, while finding a no-
solicitation rule was discriminatorily enforced, noted the dictum in Central Freight Lines
and questioned the significance accorded it by the Special Master in his report. See id. at
1021. The Trailways court stated:
Without commenting further on this dictum, we note that it involves a balance
between the undisputed right of employees to self-organization and the equally
undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments ....
[W]here a valid no-solicitation rule is discriminatorily applied only to union activ-
ity, the presumption arises that the rule does not serve the legitimate ends of
plant order and production. In such a case, the employer would have to introduce
evidence of special circumstances necessary to justify such discriminatory
application.
Id. at 1021 n.16 (citations omitted).
It is asserted that the D.C. Circuit's ruling rests on tenuous authority at best, and is
hardly persuasive justification for upholding Dameron's dismissal in light of the "actual in-
terference" standard discussed infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
42 See Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1402 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). In William L. Bonnell Co. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1969), the
court noted that when other types of solicitation go unchallenged "the inference arises that
the rules are not being used simply to serve the ends of plant order and production." Id. at
595. See also George Washington Univ. Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1373-74 (1977) (discrimi-
nation against union activity implied if similarly disruptive solicitation allowed); Selwyn
Shoe Mfg. Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 674, 676 (1968) (anti-union activist's discharge improper
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ration holding was contrary to the long-established precedent that
no-solicitation rules are valid solely because they are designed to
enhance and protect production while safeguarding workplace
discipline.
By rejecting a standard which measured disparate enforce-
ment by contrasting the actual effects of permitted workplace so-
licitation against the actual disruptive effects of employee attempts
to unionize, the Restaurant Corporation court unwisely ignored
the previously established interpretation of section 7 of the
NLRA.43 It is asserted that the adoption of a similarity of actual
disruption standard would allow courts to examine the real effects
of variation from the no-solicitation rule. Courts then could more
easily determine whether or not an employer, as required by sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, would have terminated a given em-
ployee even in the absence of his union activities." The current
upon showing that solicitation activity, not abdication of duties, motivated employer's ac-
tion). An employer, furthermore, may not promulgate a new no-solicitation rule in an at-
tempt to impede union organizational activity. See, e.g., NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments,
597 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1979) (initial promulgation at commencement of organiza-
tional activity strong evidence of discriminatory intent); NLRB v. Electro Plastic Fabrics,
Inc., 381 F.2d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 1967) (rule promulgated to impede organizational activity as
other activities permitted after formulation).
41 See Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1403-04 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). A review of Board precedent reveals that when considering whether or
not a no-solicitation rule has been enforced disparately, the Board consistently has based its
decisions on the actual disruptive effects of the respective union and nonunion solicitations.
See George Washington Univ. Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1373-74 (1977) (no solicitation rule
disparately enforced because nonunion solicitation was "neither more essential to nor less
disruptive of, the effective functioning of the hospital"); Hanes Hosiery, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B.
338, 350 (1975) (dismissal of union soliciting employee invalid where the solicitations were
"not shown to have actually impeded work."); Daylin Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 281, 281 (1972)
("only a substantial business justification, such as a genuine interference with the progress
of the work, justifies any restriction on this right of solicitation") (emphasis added).
As Judge MacKinnon noted in dissent, "the social solicitations permitted by the Com-
pany were only nominally disruptive of the workplace, but the same is true of Dameron's
solicitation." Restaurant Corp., 801 F.2d at 1402 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). It is asserted that since Dameron's solicitations lasted less than five
minutes and involved only two employees, as opposed to the condoned "social solicitations"
which involved approximately twelve employees, Judge MacKinnon correctly classified the
actual effect on the workplace as de minimus. See id. (MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). Such a finding, it is suggested, is inconsistent with the majority
opinion finding that the Board's determination of disparate application of the no-solicita-
tion rule was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1394 n.2. (MacKinnon, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part).
4 See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 899 (1982). An employer violates section 8(a)(3) when he en-
gages in discriminatory conduct motivated by an anti-union animus. See, e.g., NLRB v.
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"potential for disruption" standard effectively permits employers
to select certain solicitations and their consequential negative ef-
fects on production and discipline, while simultaneously enforcing
no-solicitation rules against union activities that have a similar or
lesser detrimental effect on workplace production and discipline.
By finding union solicitation inherently more "potentially disrup-
tive" than other permitted and condoned solicitation of similar in-
tensity, it is asserted that the court puts union activity in a less
preferred, rather than in a more preferred, position, as is man-
dated by'the Act.45
CONCLUSION
Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to associate
and organize with one another, limited only by management's le-
gitimate concern over production and discipline. The standard
adopted by the Restaurant Corporation court impedes organiza-
tional activity while, at the same time, allowing employers to per-
mit similarly disruptive nonunion activity to affect workplace pro-
duction and discipline. The court has deviated from established
Board policy and, more fundamentally, has ventured into labor
policy formulation, an area in which the court has little or no ex-
pertise. In future cases of alleged discriminatory enforcement of
no-solicitation rules, the Board and courts should determine
whether or not an employer tolerated similarly disruptive nonun-
ion solicitations in the past. Adoption of a "similarity of actual dis-
ruption standard" will more accurately determine an employer's
true motivation for discharging employees engaged in statutorily
protected activity.
John V. Tesoriero
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 288 (1965) (anti-union motivation will convert an otherwise ordinary
business act into an unfair labor practice). An employer may defend against such a charge
only by asserting a legitimate business reason for the conduct. See NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). In Wright Line, the Board formulated a causation test
which required an employer to show that the disciplinary action would have occurred re-
gardless of the union activity. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980). Prior to
Wright Line there had been two inconsistent standards to determine whether or not a sec-
tion 8(a)(3) violation had taken place. See Comment, Labor Law - Employer Violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of NLRA If Employee Would Not Have Been Discharged But For Union Ac-
tivity - Burden of Persuasion Remains with Employee, 28 VILL. L. REv. 470, 475-80 (1982).
It is submitted in light of the similarity of actual disruption caused by Dameron's solicita-
tions and the "social" solicitations, Dameron would not have been terminated absent an
anti-union motivation on the part of RCA.
" See supra note 37 (discussion of "union" solicitation as compared to "social"
solicitation).
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